Afghan Press Author: Nashna

Change in the American Strategy in Afghanistan is a hot topic these days and is most probably aimed at creating a new hope in the increasingly becoming hopeless citizens of Afghanistan but if it is once again one of those Washington-made strategies, which are in many cases based on the false assumptions of people who are considered to be experts on Afghanistan while in reality they even do not understand the basic psychology of the Afghan society, will be a last pin on the coffin of Afghan hopes.

Any disheartening comments on in-pipeline new American strategy may be premature but if some of its pillars are what have been circulating in the news then it is extremely important that prior to its finalization it is given a very cautious second look.

Lessons learned from one experience can be very useful in any other similar exercise but only when both are in somehow similar environments. Iraq and Afghanistan are two different countries with different social, economical and political environments. A relatively successful surge in Iraq does not mean that such a surge will have the same success in Afghanistan, and the role of Sunni Iraqis who have had a big hand in weakening Al-Qaida in Iraq can not be played by tribal militias in Afghanistan in any way.

Al-Qaida members in Iraq were and are mainly non-Iraqi Arabs while Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan are mainly Afghans and Pakistanis having roots in local community. Will the mostly illiterate and conservative Muslim Afghans and Pakistanis rise against the Taliban especially with the support of America?

A kind of local resistance against Taliban in some parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan is emerging and is in very early stages which should not be endangered by linking it with western support. If it is misperceived by common people than it may end up in that early stages but if it is indirectly strengthen with other mechanisms such as conditional development assistance it will get momentum.

A military surge in Afghanistan with a different terrain from Iraq will mean more collateral damage and more civilian casualties that will in turn further alienate common people from both the Government and international community.

Creation of tribal militias is a dangerous game, if it is being considered as part of an exit strategy than it may work otherwise its longer term outcome and impact will have wider adverse effects which will not be bearable for this war torn country. The tribal structure in the hot spots of insurgency is divided by different lines and the conflict of last three decades has seriously damaged this once unofficial structure of governance. During the communist regime, then during the mujahedeen era and finally during the Taliban regime, tribal leaders had been weakened and they have not remained as powerful as they were once and their vacuum has been filled by commanders which are now called warlords. Any other effort to further strengthen the warlords will mean a potential anarchism.

Talks with Taliban will have certain positive impact but it will not put an end to insurgency. Actually, it is hard to divide Taliban by pro Al-Qaeda and non-Al-Qaeda Taliban instead they can be distinguished as political and military wings. Even during the Taliban regime, the role of its political wing was not very influential. Negotiations with the political wing may weaken the ideology of talibanization and if brought to the main stream politics will be an affective achievement.

It will be better that new strategy focus on and the new American administration invest in the Afghan National Army, and increase the involvement of local communities in a comprehensive counter insurgency strategy through conditional development assistance. Under the current anti-narcotics strategy those provinces are being provided with alternative livelihood assistance that are free of opium or has drastically decreased its production. The same can be applied in the counter-insurgency strategy, and this approach has been successfully used in some community based projects in most volatile parts of the country where assistance has been given with the guarantee of security.

The claims by some journalists of western media who come to Afghanistan on short visits and stay in four and five star hotels are not evidence-based that the Afghanistan National Army is failing. In view of their numbers, equipments and resources and a parallel corrupt and weak civilian administration which have disappointed and alienated people from the Government, the achievements of national army are admirable.

The support received by Taliban from both their external supporters and local people is greater qualitatively than that is received by Afghan army from international community and common people. There is a hope that with the declining oil prices the support of Taliban will decrease but it is again the responsibility of international community to dry up its stream that originates from the oil fields of gulf and reach to the tribal areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan through main urban centers of Pakistan. The proportion of money that Taliban may receive indirectly from narcotics is much lower than what they receive from Arab Sheikhs yet the later is mostly neglected in efforts aimed at drying up the financial support of Taliban.

No solution can be a good remedy for the bleeding wounds of the country that is being going through many natural and man-made disasters unless it is not produced in Kabul with extensive inputs from the people who have been in this country during the last three decades and not those who have come in parachutes.

atiq.nashna@gmail.com